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Abstract
This study is a re-examination of Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s 
“Propaganda Model”, which hypothesizes that the market-driven, institutionalized 
filters determine the way in which the “agenda-setting” media in the United States 
cover and portray news. Further, the theory posits that these filters will reinforce the 
modes of control for the dominant elites in power. This evaluation concentrates on 
the treatment of so-called “worthy and unworthy victims” and relies on a content 
analysis of news coverage of the massacres occurring simultaneously in Kosovo and 
East Timor in 1999. In line with the “Propaganda Model,” the analysis showed that 
the volume of reporting on acts of violence increased when the perpetrators are 
affiliated with an “enemy” state and, conversely, decreased when the perpetrators are 
supported by the United States government. Analysis on whether political 
motivations affected the quality of analysis was inconclusive.
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UN/WORTHY: THE US PRINT MEDIA’S PORTRAYAL OF THE KOSOVO AND
EAST TIMOR MASSACRES
CHAPTER I 
Introduction
Situation Analysis
In the United States, the news media is influential as it is ubiquitous. From the 
Internet to the 24-hour-a-day news channels to news broadcasts to cellular phones, radios 
and miniature personal computers, it is a vital component of the basis for opinion in the 
US. Accordingly, it is no secret that there are a plethora of forces arrayed in the hopes of 
influencing the media in pursuit of their various goals. News programs are book-ended 
by trillions of dollars of advertising, and virtually all organizations employ public 
relations professionals to promote them within the news content itself. What is unclear to 
a majority of the population, is the extent to which the news content they receive is 
controlled by elites in power (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
In 1988, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky published Manufacturing 
Consent, a book in which they outlined their “Propaganda Model” (PM) theory to 
explain the way various subjects are treated by the news media in a manner that serves 
the interest of the elite interests in power while also affording a measure of concealment 
of this exercise of power. The elite interests are generally defined as those individuals or 
unaffiliated organizations with sufficient wealth and power to influence national policy to 
serve their interests. This is different from other countries where more authoritarian 
governments may maintain a monopoly over the media and overtly censor its coverage of 
the news, in which case it is obvious to see whom the news media serves. Differentiating
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from the variety of media which exist in the United States, Chomsky and Herman are 
referring specifically to the “agenda-setting” media, which Chomsky defines as;
. . .  the elite media, sometimes called the agenda-setting media because they are 
the ones with the big resources, they set the framework in which everyone else 
operates. The New York Times and CBS . . . their audience is mostly privileged 
people. The people who read the New York Times—people who are wealthy or 
part of what is sometimes called the political class—they are actually involved in 
the political system in an ongoing fashion. They are basically managers of one 
sort or another. They can be political managers, business managers (like corporate 
executives or that sort of thing), doctoral managers (like university professors), or 
other journalists who are involved in organizing the way people think and look at 
things (1997, n.p.).
Chomsky differentiates the “agenda-setting” media from the “popular media,” which 
includes recreational news media such as entertainment or sports journalism.
The title of Chomsky and Herman’s work comes from a concept first advanced by 
Walter Lippmann in the first part of the twentieth century. Lippmann advocated that 
propaganda had become “a regular organ of popular government” and that its purpose 
was for the “manufacture of consent” (as quoted in Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. lix). 
Problem Statement
For various reasons, there are invariably inequities in news coverage which result 
in the creation of “worthy” and “unworthy” victims who receive more or less coverage, 
respectively. As Chomsky and Herman observe, one factor contributing to the 
manifestation of this inequity in coverage is political ideology, in response to various
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pressures exerted on the media in the free market system in whieh it operates. As
Chomsky has explained;
all the media, agenda-setting and popular, are huge corporations. Like every 
corporation they have a product and they sell it to a market. The market is 
advertisers. The product is people, that is, audiences. So when you look at the 
agenda-setting media, the ‘product’ that they are ‘selling’ is privileged audienees.
. . .  Just on the most elementary free market principles, what you would expeet is 
a picture that responds to the interest and eoncems of the sellers, the buyers and 
the ‘produet’ (all of whom are members of the Aineriean Elite), which is exactly 
what happens (Kwan, 1992, p. A15).
To this end, they summarized these faetors as five “filters”:
(1) the size, eoncentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the 
dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income souree of the 
mass media; (3) the relianee of the media on information provided by 
government, business and “experts” funded and approved by these primary 
sources and agents of power; (4) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media; and 
(5) ‘anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988, p. 2).
Put another way, the propaganda model . . .
. . .  postulates that the elite media interlock with other institutional sectors in 
ownership, management and social circles, effectively cireumscribing their ability 
to remain analytically detached from other dominant institutional sectors. The
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model argues that the net result of this is self-eensorship without any significant 
coercion (Klaehn, 2002, p. 147).
One prominent example discussed in Manufacturing Consent is US opposition to 
Communism. As the fall of the Soviet Union precipitated a drop in the level of the threat 
Communism poses to the United States and the spread of democracy abroad, another 
aspect of the continued applicability of Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model 
should be reviewed given that a principal feature of the fifth tenet of their theory, 
“anticommunism as a national religion and control mechanism” (Herman & Chomsky, 
1988, p. 2). It should be noted, however, that Chomsky and Herman hinted at a broader 
definition of the fifth filter in Manufacturing Consent, when they wrote “this ideology 
helps mobilize the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is fuzzy it can be 
used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or support 
accommodation . . .  with radicalism” (1988, p. 29). Herman also later asserted that;
the fifth filter -  anticommunist ideology -  is possibly weakened by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and global socialism, but this is easily offset by the greater 
ideological force of the belief in the ‘miracle of the market.’ There is now an 
almost religious faith in the market, at least among the elite, so that regardless of 
evidence, markets are assumed benevolent and non-market mechanisms are 
suspect (Herman, 2002, n.p.).
The “miracle of the market” is a phrase describing the equity and progress purported to 
come from a free market system. The phrase is attributed to libertarian Leonard Read 
and has been adopted by neoliberals and political conservatives, most notably the Reagan 
Administration.
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Later, in 1998, Chomsky made a similar observation and refined the theory 
further by noting that the filter still remains but that it has been replaced with a similar 
ideological filter that very closely resembles the United States following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, 2001. He describes the prevailing ideology as one which 
promotes . . .
. . .  the idea that grave enemies are about to attack us and we need to huddle 
under the protection of domestic power. You need something to frighten people 
with, to prevent them from paying attention to what’s really happening to them. 
You have to somehow engender fear and hatred, to channel the kind of fear and 
rage -  or even just discontent -  that’s being aroused by social and economic 
conditions (Chomsky, 1998, n.p.).
An understanding of the propaganda model is helpful when studying geopolitical 
events, such as in the case of the massacres in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 and their 
portrayal in the news media. Also important is an understanding of the role of 
propaganda in the resulting policy decisions adopted by the US government. As 
Chomsky contends:
The marching orders from Washington, however, are the usual ones: Focus laser­
like on the crimes of today’s official enemy, and do not allow yourself to be 
distracted by comparable or worse crimes that could easily be mitigated or 
terminated thanks to the crucial role of the enlightened states in perpetuating 
them, or escalating them when power interests so dictate (Chomsky, 1999, n.p.). 
There is no evidence that this modified incarnation of the fifth tenet negatively 
affects the use of PM theory to understand the behavior of the mass media and that the
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same modes are still in operation. Accordingly, an analysis of a contemporary situation 
by those same methodologies should yield similar results; government poliey, and media 
reporting, will focus on atrocities being perpetrated by an enemy state, while paying 
comparatively little attention to atrocities being perpetrated by nations backed by the 
United States.
Significance o f the Problem
The importance of timely and readily-aceessible information for an educated 
populace is widely acknowledged to be a cornerstone of the democratic system of 
government. Thomas Jefferson, one of the principal founding fathers, noted in a letter to 
Edward Carrington in 1787 that;
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object 
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should 
have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I 
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every 
man should receive those papers and be capable of reading them (Coates, 1999, 
n.p.).
In this context, it becomes clear how critical unfiltered information is to the 
ability of the citizens of the United States to participate in the process of governing their 
nation. This is especially vital as the world becomes more complex, and the public 
becomes increasingly unable to remain both informed and interested in the process o f  
governance. The United States is constantly plagued by the specter of a government 
propelled by a powerful minority wielding undue influence. George Washington voiced 
this fear in his farewell address;
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All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all eombinations and associations, 
under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, 
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted 
authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. 
They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to 
put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a 
small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, according to the 
alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the 
mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the 
organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels and 
modified by mutual interests (Washington’s farewell address, 2004, n.p.).
Adding a substantial degree of urgency to this particular problem of overcoming the 
limitations imposed on understanding by the various filters articulated in the propaganda 
model and their manifestations is the fact that the U.S. government has only just resumed 
ftmding the Indonesian military, in spite of twice reducing it for genocidal acts of 
aggression against civilians in East Timor (Perlez, 2005). Following the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 on the United States, President Bush took the opportunity to turn 
around over a decade of policy with Indonesia and pledge $700 million of aid to 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukamoputri, including military and police training from 
the Expanded-Intemational Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program 
(Berrigan, 2001).
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Purpose o f the Study
The motivation for this study is to test the model advanced by Chomsky and 
Herman and its continued applicability in the modem era. If the propaganda model is 
able to provide even a small window of insight into the workings of the power structure 
in the United States (and elsewhere), it will be an invaluable tool in addressing the 
inequities of our world.
In autocratic states, where the modes of control are far more blatant and the 
propaganda is directly attributable to an easily-identifiable souree, righting injustices 
perpetrated by that force is considerably easier. The identification of those in power, as 
well as their motivations, lay bare. Accordingly, the source of the problem is easier to 
spot and deal with. In the system described by the propaganda model, such convenience 
is not afforded those who are subject to the manipulation of the powerful elites. In such a 
case, the propaganda forms the institutional framework, blunting the ability of the 
populace to see the ‘forest for the trees’.
For the purposes of this study, “violent acts” and “aggression” will be defined as 
the torture and murder of unarmed civilians by state armies or their surrogates and does 
not include warring between rival armies. Similiarly, “enemy states” will be defined as 
those nations governed by powers hostile to US interests. Conversely, “friendly states” 
will be considered those states with governments amenable to adhering to the dictates of 
the United States.
Research Questions 
This study will investigate the following questions:
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Q1 : Can a systems theory analysis of driving factors be predictive of media
treatment of world events by the “agenda-setting” news media, previously defined 
by Chomsky as the dominant media outlets with large operating budgets and 
circulations that determine the framework in which news is defined for other 
media (1997), in the United States?
Q2: Does the propaganda model articulated by Chomsky and Herman offer
insight into the motivations and behaviors that define news coverage?
Q3 : In line with the contentions of the propaganda model, does the reporting of
the agenda-setting print media differ on violent acts when perpetrated by states 
friendly to the US (Indonesia) from the reporting of similar violent acts 
perpetrated by enemy states of the US (Serbia)?
Q4: In line with the hypotheses of the propaganda model, is the quantity of
reporting by the ‘agenda-setting’ media on the topic of victims of violence 
different in the case of East Timor (when perpetrated by a client state) versus 
Kosovo (when perpetrated by an enemy state)?
Q5: In line with the hypotheses of the propaganda model, is the degree of
follow-up investigation by the “agenda-setting” media on the topic of victims of 
violence by terrorist organizations different in the in the case of Kosovo as 
opposed to East Timor?
Overview o f Thesis
This paper asks whether, in line with certain fundamental motivations, the news 
media in the United States will emphasize violence committed by interests that oppose 
US foreign policy goals and simultaneously downplay violence by organizations within
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the government’s sphere of influence. This emphasis ^vill take the shape of an increased 
amount of coverage, an increased level of detail in the eoverage, and an increased level of 
follow-up on stories deseribing violence against eivilians by enemy states, and the 
eonverse when the violenee is inflicted by an ally or elient of the US. For simplicity, this 
phenomenon is referred to as the designation of “worthy and unworthy vietims” (Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988, p. 37). The assumptions that form the basis for this hypothesis are 
illustrated by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman in their book Manufacturing Consent.
This contention will be tested by a content analysis of the print media’s coverage 
of nearly simultaneous and proportional massacres occurring in East Timor and Kosovo.
It posits that victims of violence in Kosovo will be treated as “worthy” vietims, meaning 
that their eoverage in the media will be of a greater degree, quality and follow-up. 
Conversely, it posits that victims of violence in East Timor will be treated as “unworthy” 
victims, and be afforded little or no eoverage and that the coverage will be charaeterized 
by less detail and follow-up.
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review
The notion that the media’s coverage of world events is colored by various 
interests is hardly a new one. As long as the mass media have existed, there have been 
critics and advocates of the power of that media to shape public opinion and direct the 
course of human events. The US media’s treatment of violence in the similar situations 
of Kosovo and East Timor affords us a unique side-by-side case study to analyze its 
operations with the structural framework devised by the propaganda model.
Propaganda 
Edward Bernays and the Post-WWl era
Perhaps one of the earliest and most highly-regarded figures to analyze the media 
and its ability to affect public opinion is Edward Bemays, widely regarded as the father 
of the public relations profession. His work Propaganda forms the basis for the 
discipline of public relations, and has had far-reaching influence on the operations of 
those who wield political and economic power in the United States ever since it was first 
published in 1928. Bemays summarizes the role of communication in govemance with 
the provocative declaration “ours must be a leadership democracy administered by the 
intelligent minority who know how to regiment and guide the masses” (1928/2005, p. 
127).
Bemays observes “the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized 
habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society” 
(1928/2005, p. 37). This vision of the govemance of the United States is markedly 
different from the one generally held by the public; conventional wisdom holds that each
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citizen forms his or her own opinion and votes accordingly, independent of any conscious 
efforts by elite interests to affect that opinion. For Bemays, such a system is impractical 
and idealistic and ought be supplanted by a different form of govemanee:
In theory, every citizen makes up his mind on public questions and matters of 
private conduct. In practice, if all men had to study for themselves the abstmse 
economic, political, and ethical data involved in every question, they would find it 
impossible to come to a eonclusion without anything. We have voluntarily agreed 
to let an invisible government sift the data and high-spot the outstanding issue so 
that our field of ehoice shall be narrowed to practieal proportions (1928/2005, p.
Elsewhere in his book, Bemays explicates the role of the media further, offering a 
foreboding note for the future:
This invisible, interwining structure of groupings and assoeiations is the 
mechanism by which democracy has organized its group mind and simplified its 
mass thinking. To deplore the existenee of sueh a mechanism is to ask for a 
society such as never was and never will be. To admit that it exists, but expeet 
that it shall not be used, is unreasonable (p. 44).
Having witnessed the specter of the first World War, and observing closely how 
effective mass communications could be for mobilizing public opinion, Bemays gained 
unique insight into the thought processes of the general public. He vsrote that every 
significant social occurrence “. . .  whether in politics, finance, manufacture, agriculture, 
charity, education, or other fields, must be done with the help of propaganda.
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Propaganda is the executive arm of the invisible government” (Bemays, 1928/2005, p. 
20).
To be fair, Bemays had a different definition of “propaganda” than the pejorative 
version used today. For him, propaganda was more a teehnieal term, referring to a 
“consistent, enduring effort to crate or shape events to influence the relations of the 
public to an enterprise, idea or group” (Bernays, 1928/2005, p. 52).
Again indicative of the historical post-war period in which he was writing, 
Bemays’ body of scholarship is particularly significant for this discussion as he described 
precisely the first fledgling efforts to use the tactic of creating “worthy” and “unworthy” 
vietims as Chomsky and Herman observe in the modern era. Bemays notes during World 
War I that “. . .  the manipulators of patriotic opinion made use of the mental cliches and 
the emotional habits of the public to produce mass reactions against the alleged atrocities, 
the terror, and the tyranny of the enemy,” continuing “it was only natural, after the war 
ended, that intelligent persons should ask themselves whether it was possible to apply a 
similar technique to the problems of peace” (1928/2005, p. 55). The manner in which the 
public will can be shaped is nearly endless, according to Bemays, who advised “there is 
no means of human communication which may not also be a means of deliberate 
propaganda, because propaganda is simply the establishing of reciprocal understanding 
between and individual and a group” (p. 161).
Walter Lippman and Public Opinion
Another significant body of scholarship, referenced heavily by Chomsky and 
Herman, is the work of Walter Lippman, specifically his seminal work Public Opinion. 
Lippmann coined the term “manufacturing consent,” which became the title of Chomsky
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and Herman’s seminal work on the process by which the will of the goals of the elites in 
power are adopted by the masses. Like Bernays, Lippmann was publishing his work 
following the first World War when propaganda truly became an industrialized operation, 
and wrote at length about the interplay between world governments and their interactions 
with the masses.
For Lippmann, there are two “visions” of democracy, one which is controlled by 
“the self-sufficient individual” and another in which “an Oversoul regulate [s] everything” 
(1922/1997, p. 146). Chomsky refers to the latter as a “spectator democracy” (Chomsky, 
2002, p. 19). Like Bemays, Lippmann believes that true democracy is impractical when 
one considers the demands it places upon the system to adequately inform the 
participants;
. . .  no amount of balloting can obviate the need of creating an issue, be a measure 
or a candidate, on which the voters can say Yes or No. There is, in fact, no such 
thing as ‘direct legislation.’ . . .  The citizen goes to the polls, receives a ballot on 
which a number of measures are printed, almost always in abbreviated form, and, 
if he says anything at all, he says Yes or No. . . .  You have to commit violence 
against the English language to call that legislation (1922/1997, p. 148).
He also observes, “it is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma 
of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up 
spontaneously” (p. 158). In effect, Lippmann sees a coercion of opinion by a ruling elite 
to be a necessity in a democracy. As he continues.
It is not necessary, then to invent a collective intelligence in order to explain why 
the judgments of a group are usually more coherent, and often more true to form
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than the remarks of a man in the street. One mind, or a few can pursue a train of 
thought, but a group trying to think in concert as a group can do little more than 
assent or dissent (Lippmann, p. 145).
Lippmann makes a number of observations about the manifestations of this picture of an 
elite group of decision makers which pertain directly to international affairs and the 
relative ease with which these interests can nose the public in the direction of the policies 
they wish to see put into place.
If those whom [the leader] needs in his plan are remote from the place where the 
action takes place, if the results are hidden or postponed,. .  the leader is likely to 
have a free hand. . . .  That is one great reason why governments have such a free 
hand in foreign affairs. Most of the frictions between two states involve a series 
of obscure and long-winded contentions, occasionally on the frontier, but far more 
often in regions about which school geographies have supplied no precise ideas 
(p. 154).
In other words, factors such as distance and language/culture become barriers to accurate, 
critical and in-depth news coverage. The expense of maintaining foreign news bureaus 
and conducting investigations makes the news media increasingly reliant on the 
government as the primary source for information and perspective on foreign affairs.
Lippmann’s work formed a theoretical basis for the propaganda efforts of the 
Allies, which were so effective that they impressed even Adolf Hitler, who remarked,
. . .  the war propaganda of the English and Americans was psychologically sound. 
By representing the Germans to their own people as barbarians and Huns, they 
prepared the individual soldier for the terrors of war, and thus helped to preserve
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him from disappointments. After this, the most terrible weapon that was used 
against him seemed only to confirm what his propagandists had told him; it 
likewise reinforced his faith in the truth of his government's assertions, while on 
the other hand it increased his rage and hatred against the vile enemy (Hitler, 
1926/1998, n.p.).
Scholars frequently echo Lippmann’s observation that . .  what cannot be 
compromised must be obliterated[;] when there is a question on which we cannot all hope 
to get together, let us pretend that it does not exist” (1922/1997, p. 130). Lippmann 
challenges the de facto assumptions about democracy, asserting as Chomsky and Herman 
do that the collective will does not magically materialize in the minds of the people of the 
nation, rather it is guided there by elites who are responsible for shaping opinion.
One critical observation made by Lippmann is on the importance of semantics as 
a component of communication, in this case news coverage. Lippmann observes that 
“the unseen environment is reported to us chiefly by words . . .  a few words must often 
stand for a whole succession of acts, thoughts, feelings and consequences” (1922/1997, 
pp. 41-42). Terms like “genocide,” “massacre,” and “ethnic cleansing” carry powerful 
connotations and their use, or lack thereof, can be important features of reports on world 
events.
For Lippmann, responsible govemance dictates that
. . .  the mass is constantly exposed to suggestion. It reads not the news, but the 
news with an aura of suggestion about it, indicating the line of action to be taken. 
It hears reports, not objective as the facts are, but already stereotyped to a certain 
pattern of behavior (1922/1997, p. 155).
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At his most prophetic, Lippmann describes the future of governance and the management 
of public opinion thusly;
The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed 
to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It 
has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis 
rather than on rule of thumb. . . .  the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A 
revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of 
economic power (p. 156).
Chomsky and Herman
Chomsky and Herman’s “Propaganda Model” forms the basis for this project, as 
has been previously mentioned. For Chomsky and Herman, the propaganda model i s . . .
. . .  our view that, among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize 
on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them. The 
representatives of these interests have important agendas and principles that they 
want to advance, and they are not well positioned to shape and constrain media 
policy. This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the 
selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors’ and working journalists’ 
internalization of priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the 
institution’s policy (1988, p. xi).
The propaganda model has been criticized by scholars such as Holsti and Rosenau 
as being “an almost conspiratorial view of the media” (Klaehn, 2002, p. 148). Chomsky 
and Herman respond to these criticisms by pointing out that their model is a “free market 
analysis” of the media in which the results are “. . . largely an outcome of the working
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market forces” (1988, p. 94). This system is appealing to elite interests because “the 
logic is clear, propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state” 
(Chomsky, 2002, p. 20). Put another way,
the structural factors that dominate media operations are not all-controlling and 
do not always produce simple and homogenous results . . .  the beauty of the 
system . . .  is that . . .  dissent and inconvenient information are kept within bounds 
and at the margins, so that while their presence shows that the system is not 
monolithic, they are not large enough to interfere unduly with the domination of 
the official agenda (Herman & Chomsky, p. xii).
Due to its broad applicability, the propaganda model has been widely applied 
across a variety of disciplines and contexts to analyze the origins of opinion and the 
driving forces that influence what is earried through the mass media (Baker; 1994, 
Gottfreid; 2001, McCombs & Shaw; 1991).
As previously established, the aspeet of the propaganda model that this particular 
work focuses on is the phenomenon of “worthy and unworthy victims.” This aspect of 
the theory postulates that victims of violence by enemy states will be the beneficiaries of 
more “intense and indignant” coverage than those victimized by either the United States 
or its clients, in the same fashion predicted by this paper (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. 
xix). In addition to worthy victims receiving “greater indignation” on their behalf, the 
crimes against them will be accompanied by a greater “search for responsibility at the 
top” (p. xx). Another nuance of the control mechanism is that unworthy victims will 
receive “more antiseptic reporting of the abuse” against them (p. xx). One way in which 
these differences in treatment manifest themselves is in the use of the word “genocide” to
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describe killings by one power or another. As Chomsky and Herman explain “genoeide 
is an invidious word that officials apply readily to cases of victimization in enemy states, 
but rarely if ever to similar or worse cases of victimization by the United States itself or 
allied regimes” (p. xx).
Contemporaries
Manufacturing Consent is not the only work that Lippmann’s theories have 
provided titular inspiration for. Another recent work that follows up on his theories as 
well as those of Chomsky and Herman is B.A. Taleb’s The Bewildered Herd, yet another 
work the name of which was derived from Lippmann’s writings.
Taleb writes,
Two main notions can explain why the media has such an ability to set both the 
public and politico-economic agendas and why it has become such a prestigious 
and effective social change and social control agent in any given society. The first 
notion relates to the advantages and disadvantages the media has in its 
relationship with the public, and the second relates to the advantages and 
disadvantages the public has in its relation with the media. Since the media is an 
enterprise, an economic analogy is best to illustrate these advantages and 
disadvantages. In simple economic terms, this prestigious status of national media 
is that where the media (the enterprise) distributes the news (products) to the 
public (the consumers). Accordingly, the advantages national media has are its 
ability to select, package, focus on certain products, create demand for its 
products, encourage consumption of certain products over others because it is 
more profitable, and to massively distribute these products. The disadvantages
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for the media in such a relationship is its own need to satisfy its public 
(consumers) and increase its market share of them, and the need to readjust its 
news (products) to constantly follow and respond to public tendencies and 
expectations. On the other hand, the disadvantage of the public in its relationship 
to the media is its growing need and dependence on these media products just as it 
depends on other products for almost every aspect of its daily life. The advantage 
the public has, in democratic societies, is that it can always have the possibility of 
sanctioning the media (the enterprise) and turning for its needs to another.. . .  To 
set an agenda, issues have to be chosen and given priority. Since the public 
depends on the media to be informed of almost every aspect of the world around 
it, from international news to domestic traffic jams passing by national policies 
and events, then it is the media that presents the issues that this public depends on 
to set its agenda. In other words, the public, due to its dependence and need for 
orientation, sees the importance of issues through the importance given to these 
issues by the media. This is the effect of the media’s advantage of being able to 
select what it presents to the public. But selection of issues to be presented alone 
is usually not enough to be effective in setting the public’s agenda (Taleb, 2004, 
pp. 522-523).
While Taleb affirms the power of the media to influence public opinion, he, like 
Chomsky and Herman, is quick to point out that it is not all-powerful, nor all- 
encompassing, noting;
the media orientation ability of public opinion is certainly not an absolute and 
unviable reality. Though the media is extremely influential in forming, modeling.
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and directing public opinion . . . this ability of the media is, nonetheless not 
without limitations” (Taleb, 2004, p. 457).
Testing the propaganda model, Taleb compared the coverage of the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991-1995 to the conflict in Chechnya from 1991-1996, 
adding the dimension of analyzing of coverage in the French news media in addition to 
the United States news media. This marks one of the first attempts to use the propaganda 
model outside of the context of the United States by drawing upon the intertwined 
interests of France and the United States. For Taleb’s analysis, the victims in Bosnia 
served as the “worthy” victims, for the same reasons that the Kosovar Albanians 
occupied this institutional role. As the propaganda model would predict that the elite 
interests in the United States would shy away from criticism of the Russian government 
for mistreating the Chechens for fear of having the Russian government point out similar 
actions by the U.S., the Chechens served as the “unworthy” victims for Taleb’s analysis. 
The two served as ideal case studies as, “. . .  they both involved a repeated quest for 
independence,” “. . . were part of a ‘forced union,”’ and “.. . shared the fact that the great 
majority of the population of the two concerned regions of conflict are of the Muslim 
confession” (Taleb, 2004, p. 157). In analyzing Le Monde and the New York Times, 
Taleb found that “in general, both newspapers used more tragic adjectives to describe the 
events in Bosnia than in Chechnya” (p. 330). Further, “ethnic cleansing” was mentioned 
14 times between Le Monde and the New York Times in reference to Bosnia, but zero 
times in reference to Chechnya.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Un/Worthy 22
Case Study: Kosovo and East Timor 
In the new introduetion to their book Manufacturing Consent, Chomsky and 
Herman briefly explored a eomparison of the media’s coverage of the situations in East 
Timor and Kosovo. In their qualitative analysis, they found a definite trend for the media 
to apply the word “genocide” for victims of enemy states, but not nearly as often for 
victims of the U.S. or its client states. Specifically, an analysis of the Los Angeles Times, 
the New York Times, the Washington Post, Newsweek and Time found that, between 1998 
and 1999, those publications applied the term “genoeide” 220 times when referring to the 
Kosovo situation. Conversely, over a 10-year period from 1990 to 1999, they only used 
the term “genocide” in reference to the Indonesia/East Timor situation 33 times (Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988, xxi). Their analysis showed a similar result when comparing the 
treatment of the Kurds by Iraq and Turkey; Iraq (an enemy state) saw its treatment of the 
Kurdish population labeled as “genoeide” 132 times, whereas Turkey (a client state) saw 
only 14 mentions of its mistreatment of its Kurdish population as “genoeide.” Chomsky 
and Herman bolstered their analysis by comparing two specific massacres in Racak, 
Kosovo and Liquica, Indonesia. Despite the fact that some 200 East Timorese were 
murdered at Liquica, compared to 45 at Raeak, coverage of the Racak killings far 
outstripped the Liquica killings by a measure of 4.1 to 1. Moreover, the use of the term 
“massacre” was more numerous for Racak by a measure of 6.7 to 1. Their research also 
found that “the greater length of accounts of the Racak event elevates the ratio to 14 to 1 
as measured by word count” (Herman & Chomsky, p. xxiv).
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About East Timor
East Timor is a small island nation between the Savu and Timor seas that was 
formerly a Portuguese colony before it was annexed by Indonesia in 1975 in a campaign 
that caused roughly 200,000 deaths (About Timor-Leste, 2005). It is populated 
primarily by Austronesians (Malayo-Polynesians) and Papuans, 90% of whom are 
adherents to the Roman Catholic religion. In 1999, the World Bank Group estimated its 
total population at 788,000, though other estimates put it as high as 900,000 (The World 
Bank Group, 2004). During the 1990s, East Timor was the victim of ongoing atrocities 
perpetrated first by the Indonesian military, and later by paramilitaries trained by and 
working closely with the Indonesian military. Another salient fact is that Indonesia has 
long been the recipient of military aid from the United States (among other nations) in the 
form of training, arms, and funding. In 1999, despite Indonesia’s decades of human 
rights abuses against the East Timorese, it still received $476,000 in military aid from the 
United States (Becker, 1999).
In the late 1960s, Indonesia became important to the United States for several 
reasons, chiefly because of the region’s oil reserves but also because East Timor controls 
a major shipping route. In documents declassified in 2004, it was confirmed that the U.S. 
has long intervened under a veil of secrecy in the region. The Nixon administration 
concluded that Indonesia rigged elections to subvert an independence movement in the 
western Irian Jay a province. “. . . despite this assessment, Henry Kissinger, the then 
national security advisor, counseled President Richard Nixon to express understanding 
about Indonesia’s annexation of the resource-rich area now known as West Papua . . . ” 
(Sipress, 2004, p. A20). It was these factors that prompted the U.S. to train, arm and fund
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the Indonesian military so that it can serve as a client state to represent U.S. interests in 
the region. This support for Indonesia’s brutal regime is confirmed by Jay Solomon and 
Thomas E. Ricks of the Wall Street Journal;
A move involving the militaries of Australia and the U.S. specifically would stir 
resentment, because in 1975, those nations backed the Indonesian takeover of the 
Portuguese colony, out of fear that an independent -  and perhaps a communist -  
East Timor could undermine the stability of Southeast Asia’s largest eountry 
(Solomon & Ricks, 1999, p. A 19).
US support of Indonesia did not merely take the form of diplomaey, however, as 
millions of dollars of military hardware were sold to the Indonesian government in 
addition to military training from US ageneies. These practiees continue today; in 1999 
alone, and in spite of the history of unchecked human rights violations perpetrated by the 
Indonesian military, the defense department spent $50 million on the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Other notable examples of the IMET 
program’s influence include El Salvador where the Atlaetl special forces battalion 
murdered six Jesuit priests in the late 1980s, in addition to eonsiderable partieipation in 
other horrors during that nation’s civil war.
East Timor has suffered perhaps one of the highest death tolls proportionate to the 
population of any nation in modern history, with an estimated 200,000 dead since 
Indonesia annexed the province. “One in every three East Timorese was killed or has 
died from starvation since the Indonesian invasion” (Husarska, 1999, p. 9). Atrocities 
against the East Timorese have continued unabated for decades, but were made worse in 
1999 with a vote for independence. In spite of already demonstrated threats of violence.
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nearly 99% of the population turned out and voted by an almost 80% majority to declare 
independence from Indonesia (Emmerson, 1999). This vote prompted the massacres that 
are the primary subject of the East Timorese portion of this paper.
The contention of this paper, in line with the propaganda model, is that the 
unflattering nature of the history of U.S. involvement in Indonesia will be seldom 
discussed as it paints a negative picture of our reason for a lack of intervention on East 
Timor’s behalf for the past two decades.
About Kosovo
Kosovo is bordered by several nations, including Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, and 
Montenegro and is populated by a majority of Muslim ethnic Albanians, and a much 
smaller minority of Christian Serbians. The United Nations Population Fund estimates 
Kosovo’s population at just over 2 million (Profile: Kosovo, 2003). Originally formed as 
part of Yugoslavia in 1918, it participated in resisting German occupation during World 
War 11, ultimately becoming a communist nation under Marshall Tito. Following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia fell apart during the 1990s, separating into 
independent states according to various ethnic groups; Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (CIA - the World, 2005). During this time, 
Slobodan Milosevic attempted to unite ethnic Serbians in the various countries into a 
“Greater Serbia” which caused fighting between Serbian Forces and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army which fought for Kosovo’s autonomy. In 1999, the a US-led NATO 
coalition intervened in Kosovo and bombed Serbia for 78 days following diplomatic 
failures in Rambouillet, France. This campaign also resulted in Yugoslavia’s expulsion
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from the United Nations and Milosevic’s indictment as a war criminal in the International 
Criminal Tribunal (CIA - the World, 2005).
Also in line with the propaganda model, it is the contention of the writer that the 
media coverage will favor the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in order to demonize both 
Serbia and Russia as a means of focusing attention away from other U.S. pursuits abroad. 
Similarities
In 1999, Kosovo and East Timor shared a surprisingly-similar station in the 
world. Both were small, ethnically-distinct nations that sought autonomy from the 
authoritarian regimes seeking to incorporate them. The Wall Street Journal even 
described the similarities a September article;
In 1999 a largely Christian alliance used force against a Christian country [Serbia] 
bent on persecuting, expelling and in some cases killing a small Muslim 
population [Kosovo]. That same alliance has, thus far, staunchly refused to do the 
same to a Muslim country [Indonesia] bent on persecuting, expelling and in some 
cases killing a small Christian population [East Timor]. The difference between 
Serbia and Indonesia is, of course, a matter of both size and distance. But the 
lessons to be drawn from either case are not, in the end, all that different (Cohen, 
1999, p. A44).
These similarities are expounded upon by Anna Husarska of the Media Studies Center as 
she notes
both are provinces inhabited mostly by people whose religion, language and 
ethnicity differ from those of the powers trying to dominate them . . .  in . . .
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Kosovo, less than 10% of the 2 million inhabitants are Serbian and . . . in . . . East
Timor, less than 10% of the 900,000 are Indonesian (1999, p. 9).
Differences
Dwarfed in population by Kosovo, East Timor proportionately suffered a similar 
number of casualties as a result of the violence inflicted on them by the Indonesian 
government, which makes the deaths much higher in proportion than in Kosovo. 
According to In 1999, the TNI anti-independence campaign . .  drove an estimated 
750,000 of East Timor’s 880,000 people from their homes” in addition to destroying 
nearly 70% of the country (as cited in Chomsky, 2000, p. 26). This is but a small 
selection from East Timor’s bloody recent history.
In 1975, the Indonesian government invaded and annexed East Timor. This was 
done with the aid of the United States, France, Great Britain and Australia who have sold 
Indonesia over $1 billion in arms over the past three decades (Hartung, 1999). In 
addition, the United States has provided millions of dollars worth of aid and training to 
the Indonesian military through the International Military Education and Training 
program.
Another critical difference that separates Kosovo and East Timor is that, whereas 
Kosovars had the modest defense accorded them by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 
the East Timorese had no such armed guerilla force to discourage violence against them. 
A significant number of casualties counted in the Kosovo crisis are Kosovo Liberation 
Army members who were killed in skirmishes with the invading Yugoslav Army.
The death tolls in East Timor and Kosovo are an interesting feature given the 
effort exerted in each case to locate bodies and collect evidence for war crimes
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prosecutions. In Kosovo, the international community dispatched hundreds of forensic 
experts to perform autopsies and study massacre sites. They found that the level of 
slaughter was not nearly as bad as had been predicted, and the figure of 10,000 dead 
quickly dropped when anecdotal accounts could not be confirmed. One Spanish 
pathologist remarked “Rwanda was a true genocide. Kosovo was ethnic cleansing light” 
(Pearl & Block, 1999, p. Al). By late November, the death toll had been revised 
downward significantly, a fact that was trumpeted by President Clinton’s political 
opposition at the time.
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CHAPTER III 
Methodology
The analysis performed for this paper is a content analysis of the news coverage 
given to the simultaneous conflicts in East Timor and Kosovo by the “agenda-setting” 
media. Specifically, the media outlets that are the subject of this analysis were the print 
media, and were measured for both the quantity of coverage that they devoted to the 
conflicts in East Timor and Kosovo for the purposes of comparing the disparity between 
the two.
Sample Selection
The media selected for analysis were chosen due to their high circulation; the 
daily newspapers (the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, the New York Times, the Los 
Angeles Times, and the Washington Post) represent the top five highest circulation dailies 
(respectively) in the United States. The print weekly publications (Time and Newsweek) 
are the top two newsweekly magazines (respectively). This is in keeping with the 
definition of the “agenda-setting” media established by Chomsky and Herman (1988).
For all variables analyzed, none of the articles were treated as mutually exclusive; that is 
to say an article that mentioned both Kosovo and East Timor was counted equally for 
each.
Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis for this paper was performed using several online 
databases, using Boolean search operators to probe the databases for references to certain 
word combinations. The searches were limited to the period of dates between January 1, 
1999 and December 31, 1999. The database services were selected based on their
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offerings; there is not one database which contains comprehensive, full-text archives of 
all of the print media used for this analysis. Lexisnexis was used to probe the archives of 
USA Today, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Newsweek. Electric Library 
was selected to probe the archives of the Los Angeles Times and Time magazine. Finally, 
Proquest was used to access the archives of the Wall Street Journal.
The Boolean search operators used were, for example, “East Timor” when 
querying the databases for references to East Timor, and “Kosovo” when querying the 
databases for references to Kosovo. The search strings for combinations of key words 
were, for example, “East Timor” AND “Genocide”.
Duplicate entries, which arose (for example) when a database archived both the 
early and late editions of a given paper or magazine, were deleted and only the late 
edition version of the story was counted. Corrections to existing articles were treated as 
separate references. Further, non-U.S. editions of the news media sources were not 
included in the analysis; for example the International and Atlantic editions of Newsweek 
were excluded.
Qualitative Analysis 
For the qualitative analysis of the articles published referencing East Timor and 
Kosovo, the same publications (the daily papers - the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, 
the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post and the 
newsweeklies - Time and Newsweek) and databases (Lexisnexis, Electric Library, and 
Proquest) were selected. The same resulting lists of search results used in the 
quantitative analysis were also used for the qualitative analysis. For the purposes of the 
analysis, multiple letters to the editor contained in the same edition of the article were
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counted as one article. Articles which referenced the two nations during the period were 
counted regardless of what type of writing they were (i.e. letter to the editor, op/ed piece, 
news story, correction, etc.).
For the analysis, the content of each article was analyzed to see if it contained 
reference to any of five variables chosen to determine the depth or quality of coverage on 
the events unfolding in both countries in 1999. Those five variables were: historical 
context, details of the manner of death, mentions of the names of the deeeased, follow-up 
in the aftermath of the attaeks, and articles mentioning the U.S. role in each of the 
conflicts. The variables and their characteristics are subsequently explained in greater 
detail.
Unofficial Sources
Another ancillary aspect of the articles that was measured was the number of 
times a speeific unofficial source involved in the confliets was quoted. For the purposes 
of this exereise, “unofficial sources” were defined as individuals or ageneies not 
governed by any external governments or agencies. For East Timor, 1996 Nobel Peace 
Laureate and Bishop, Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, was selected due to his history of 
outspoken pacifist advocacy for East Timorese independence. For Kosovo, current 
Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova was seleeted for his similar paeifist activism which led 
him to co-found the Democratic League of Kosovo. Rugova was also the recipient of the 
Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 1998.
“Victims” were strictly defined as persons directly involved in the massacres in 
East Timor and Kosovo. For example, violent reprisals against Serbians by ethnic 
Albanians following the US-led NATO bombing in Kosovo were not counted, nor were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Un/Worthy 32
the deaths of Indonesian militiamen eaused by East Timorese vigilantes. Similarly, 
deaths of ethnic Albanians caused by means other than the Serbian occupation (for 
example, by errant bombs dropped during NATO’s aerial campaign) were not counted. 
Historical Context
For historical context, the articles analyzed in the study were evaluated and 
judged on whether or not they devoted any time to explaining or referencing the historical 
background of the conflicts. To understand the events as they are reported, it is important 
to have an understanding of the historical context in which they are occurring. Historical 
mentions that did not pertain directly to the histories of either of the conflicts and their 
immediate geographic regions were not counted. References to the historical context 
were treated as one attribute of a given article, meaning that multiple references within 
the same article were counted as one.
Manner o f Death
Very often the way in which an individual dies can determine how much news 
coverage that death receives. For example, one who passes on in their sleep of natural 
causes will certainly receive less attention than one who meets a violent end “hacked to 
death by machetes.” As a measure of how detailed the coverage of the massacres was, 
the articles from each publication were analyzed for references to the manner of death of 
the victims. References to the manner of death were treated as one attribute of a given 
article, meaning that multiple references within the same article were counted as one. 
Naming the Deceased
An attempt was made to measure whether or not the articles personalized the 
stories of the victimized populations by measuring how often the names of the deceased
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were provided. References to the names of the deeeased were treated as one attribute of a 
given article, meaning that multiple references within the same article were counted as 
one.
Follow-up
Each of the articles was assessed on whether or not it contained an element of 
“follow-up” on the resolution of the events. Specifically, articles were examined and 
recorded when they contained details about the status of the victims in both confliets. 
Examples of references that meet the criterion included reports on the prosecution of war 
crimes, tallies of victims, and the status of refugees. Follow-up reports were treated as 
one attribute of a given article, meaning that multiple references within the same article 
were counted as one.
U.S. Role
Another measure of the quality of the articles used for consideration was whether 
or not they referenced the role of the United States in the initiation of or sustaining of 
either of the conflicts. For the Kosovo crisis, this meant references to the hard-nosed 
position adopted by the United States in negotiating with Serbia which forced, by many 
accounts, an unreasonable compromise on the Serbians. Though it received little 
coverage outside of the wire service accounts prior to the NATO bombing campaign, 
Serbia did offer a peace agreement that met NATO’s purported standards for diplomacy 
to continue in the face of the threat of bombing. The Serb National Assembly Resolution 
made a commitment
..  . toward the reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for 
[Kosovo], with the securing of a full equality for all citizens and ethnic
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communities and with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] (Chomsky, 
2000, p. 123).
As Chomsky put it, “NATO chose to reject diplomatic options that were not exhausted 
and to launch a military campaign.. . ” (2000, n.p.). Others echoed this sentiment, 
including Alan J. Kuperman of the Brookings Institute who noted “The haunting question 
is whether such a deal could have satisfied Milosevic and achieved peace at Rambouillet 
if only the U.S. had offered it. We will never know because America’s secretary of state 
stubbornly refused to negotiate with the Yugoslavs and instead insisted on bombing 
without first offering Milosevic the compromise he ultimately accepted” (1999, p. 1).
For the East Timor crisis, this meant references to the U.S. funding of the 
Indonesian army which organized and armed the militias committing the violence against 
the East Timorese.
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CHAPTER IV 
Findings
Quantitative Analysis
There can be little doubt that far more attention was foeused on Kosovo than on
East Timor by all of the news media outlets analyzed. As illustrated in Table 1, eoverage
of the Kosovo crisis dwarfed the violence in East Timor by a substantial measure.
Table 1
Total References
East Timor Kosovo
Wall Street Journal 67 628
USA Today 36 529
New York Times 290 2552
Los Angeles Times 82 238
Washington Post 201 1394
Time 11 25
Newsweek (U.S. Edition) 6 74
TOTAL 693 5440
Qualitative Analysis
Curiously, the overall quality of the coverage of both conflicts as measured in the 
aforementioned framework showed that, with a few exceptions, the eoverage of the East
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Timor was more comprehensive than the coverage of Kosovo. The findings suggest that 
quantity does not necessarily indicate quality.
Use o f Key Terms
The first of the qualitative analyses of the data showed a slight bias in favor of 
Kosovo. Key descriptors like “massacre” and “genocide” were slightly more likely to be 
used when describing the Kosovo killings as opposed to those in East Timor. Though 
much of the data were mixed, certain publications were much more likely to have a bias 
toward Kosovo when using terms like “massacre” and “genocide”, including the Wall 
Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Time and Newsweek.
Table 2
Use o f Key Terms (Percent)
“East Timor” 
and “Massacre”
“Kosovo” and 
“Massacre”
“East Timor” and 
“Genocide”
“Kosovo” and 
“Genocide”
Wall Street Journal 0(0%) 22 (4%) 0(0%) 11 (3%)
USA Today 3(8%) 13 (2%) 0(0%) 1 (2%)
New York Times 3(1%) 42 (2%) 4(1%) 25 (1%)
Los Angeles Times 11 (13%) 115(48%) 5(6%) 75 (32%)
Washington Post 6(3%) 32 (2%) 3(1%) 19 (1%)
Newsweek 0(0%) 24 (32%) 0 (0%) 3(4%)
Time 2 (18%) 21 (84%) 1 (9%) 11 (44%)
TOTAL 25 (4%) 269 (5%) 13 (2%) 145 (3%)
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Use o f Unofficial Sources
Another element that was measured was the use of “unoffieial” sourees by the 
media, described in Chapter III. All of the media outlets fared poorly by this measure, 
rarely quoting prominent figures associated with the victims of both conflicts.
Combined, the unofficial dissident voices of Bishop Carlos Belo and Ibrahim Rugova 
appeared in less than 1% of all of the articles about both conflicts in 1999. Of those 
meager appearances. East Timor’s pacifist dissident leader. Bishop Carlos Belo, was 
quoted far less often than Kosovo’s Ibrahim Rugova. This finding is shocking 
considering that one of the most bloody massacres took place in the residence of Bishop 
Belo as East Timorese attempted to take refuge at the site, and that the Bishop has 
historically been a figure readily-accessible to the media.
Table 3
Unofficial Sources (Percent)
Carlos Belo (East Timor) Ibrahim Rugova (Kosovo)
Wall Street Journal 0(0%) 2 (0.30%)
USA Today 0(0%) 0(0%)
New York Times 3(1%) 6 (0.20%)
Los Angeles Times 3 (3.70%) 7 (2.90%)
Washington Post 3(1.50%) 4 (0.30%)
Newsweek 0(0%) 0(0%)
Time 0(0%) 1 (4%)
TOTAL 9(1.30%) 20 (0.40%)
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Story Elements
Overall, 39% of the articles measured contained historical information about East 
Timor, as opposed to an average of 17% of Kosovo articles that contained the same detail 
(Table 4). With respect to describing the manner of reported deaths, 8% of East Timor 
articles offered this detail as opposed to only 6% of Kosovo articles (See Tables). Fifty- 
seven percent of the articles contained follow-up information for East Timor contrasted 
with 51% of the articles pertaining to Kosovo. Both sets of articles rarely provided detail 
about the unflattering U.S. role in each conflict, but again East Timor edged out Kosovo 
4% to 1%. The only variable on which the two were equal was mentions of the names of 
the deceased, which amounted to 5% of all of the articles (Table 6).
Table 4
Story Elements - History (Including Percentage)
E. Timor E. Timor (Pet) Kosovo Kosovo (Pet)
Wall Street Journal 24 36% 151 24%
USA Today 16 44% 90 17%
New York Times 112 37% 380 17%
Los Angeles Times 42 50% 49 21%
Washington Post 74 39% 211 15%
Newsweek 2 33% 18 24%
Time 3 27% 0 0%
TOTAL 273 39% 899 17%
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Table 5
Story Elements - Manner o f  Death (Including Percentage)
E. Timor E. Timor (Pet) Kosovo Kosovo (Pot)
Wall Street Journal 5 3% 16 3%
USA Today 5 14% 36 7%
New York Times 14 5% 150 6%
Los Angeles Times 6 7% 21 9%
Washington Post 18 9% 91 7%
Newsweek 3 50% 10 14%
Time 1 9% 0 0%
TOTAL 52 8% 324 6%
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Table 6
Story Elements - Named Deceased Victims (Including Percentage)
E. Timor E. Timor (Pet) Kosovo Kosovo (Pet)
Wall Street Journal 1 2% 9 1%
USA Today 6 17% 66 13%
New York Times 12 4% 106 5%
Los Angeles Times 2 2% 19 8%
Washington Post 12 6% 81 6%
Newsweek 1 17% 7 9%
Time 0 0% 0 0%
TOTAL 34 5% 288 5%
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Table 7
Story Elements - Follow-up (Including Percentage)
E. Timor E. Timor (Pet) Kosovo Kosovo (Pet)
Wall Street Journal 49 73% 331 52%
USA Today 14 39% 334 63%
New York Times 187 65% 1213 54%
Los Angeles Times 50 61% 142 52%
Washington Post 86 43% 682 49%
Newsweek 1 17% 61 82%
Time 8 73% 9 36%
TOTAL 395 57% 2772 51%
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Table 8
Story Elements - U.S. Role (Including Percentage)
E. Timor E. Timor (Pet) Kosovo Kosovo (Pet)
Wall Street Journal 0 0% 5 1%
USA Today 0 0% 17 3%
New York Times 10 3% 12 1%
Los Angeles Times 4 5% 6 3%
Washington Post 13 6% 20 1%
Newsweek I 17% 3 4%
Time 2 18% 0 0%
TOTAL 30 4% 63 1%
Individual Media Outlet Profiles
Wall Street Journal
In 1999, the Wall Street Journal ran 67 stories that referenced East Timor, while 
running 628 stories that referenced Kosovo. This disparity was typical of most of the 
media outlets, but a greater disparity emerges in the details of the Journal’s coverage of 
the conflicts. Whereas the Journal made reference to the words “massacre” and 
“genocide” 22 and 11 times, respectively in articles about Kosovo, it made zero mention 
of those terms when referring to the situation in East Timor.
Of the qualitative variables analyzed, the Wall Street Journal had poorer overall 
coverage of the Kosovo crisis than the one in East Timor. For example, 24% of articles
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pertaining to Kosovo contained historical information, compared to 36% of the articles 
about East Timor. Similarly, 52% of the Kosovo articles contained follow-up 
information, as opposed to 73% of East Timor articles.
Another Wall Street Journal commentary actually puts the blame for the 
Indonesian-sponsored atrocities on the western world and the push for human rights;
Australian peacekeeping troops are already on the ground in East Timor but the 
debate over responsibility for the recent atrocities there continues to simmer. 
Human-rights groups blame 25 years of Western coddling of Indonesia. If only 
the U.S. had applied more pressure on Jakarta, they say, the violence could have 
been avoided. The reality, however, is almost exactly the opposite. Today’s 
suffering in East Timor is a direct result of too much Western human-rights 
pressure without any precautions against the tragic, and predictable, backlash 
(Kuperman, 1999, p. Al).
This sentiment mirrored the official editorial slant of the Wall Street Journal on the East 
Timor crisis, which also took the position that a push for Indonesia’s accountability on 
human rights was to be faulted.
USA Today
Quantitatively, coverage for Kosovo far exceeded coverage for East Timor with 
the mentions of each state totaling 529 to 36 respectively.
Qualitative results for USA Today were mixed, and the quality of articles for both 
East Timor and Kosovo was approximately even. While there was considerably more 
inclusion of historical information in the East Timor articles (44% as opposed to 17% for 
Kosovo articles. Table 4) there was dramatically less follow-up information (39% as
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opposed to 63%, Table 7). As the table shows, the other variables were roughly similar 
and seemed to show no specific favoritism for either of the countries.
New York Times
Quantitative coverage of the two crises in the New York Times demonstrated one 
of the widest gaps between East Timor and Kosovo, with a total of 290 mentions for East 
Timor and 1394 mentions for Kosovo.
As measured by the five variables selected for the primary analysis, the New York 
Times had a performance in line with the other media outlets and which followed the 
trend of providing higher quality coverage on East Timor than on Kosovo. Thirty-seven 
percent of East Timor articles contained historical information as opposed to 17% of 
Kosovo articles (Table 4). In the other major variable, follow-up, 65% of East Timor 
articles met this criterion compared with 54% for Kosovo (See Table 7).
A striking feature of the bias contained in the New York Times coverage of the 
conflicts is that throughout the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the Times repeatedly ran listings 
of contact information for organizations helping the refugees in Kosovo. No such listings 
were published for refugees in any of the other conflicts going on around the world at the 
time, including East Timor, even though some of the organizations listed had ongoing 
efforts in those other nations.
Los Angeles Times
From a quantitative view, coverage of the two crises was slanted heavily in favor 
of Kosovo, with 238 articles mentioning that nation compared with 82 mentions for East 
Timor.
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Of all of the papers, the Los Angeles Times tended to provide the most 
information that dissented from the official U.S. government position, though its 
treatment of the massacres in East Timor was less than ideal. Whereas 50% of the 
articles mentioned the history of East Timor, only 21% discussed the history of Kosovo. 
Similarly 61% of the Times articles about East Timor contained follow-up details, 
compared to 52% of the Kosovo articles (See Tables 4 and 7).
Washington Post
The quantity of coverage in the Washington Post was dramatically higher for 
Kosovo than for East Timor, with a total of 1394 articles to 201.
Coverage of the massacres in the Washington Post was mixed in terms of 
qualitative variables. Numerically, coverage of the Kosovo crisis was vastly higher than 
that of East Timor, though the story elements tended to be lower as a percentage of the 
total articles for Kosovo. Of the two most prevalent story elements, 49% of the Kosovo 
articles contained follow-up information and 43% of the East Timor articles contained the 
same. Conversely 39% of the East Timor articles contained historical information as 
opposed to 15% of the Kosovo articles that appeared in the Washington Post (See Tables 
4 and 7).
Time Magazine
As with many of the other publications analyzed, results were mixed with Time 
magazine. Seventy-three percent of the articles that dealt with East Timor contained 
follow-up information about the situation as opposed to 3 6% of the Kosovo articles. 
Strikingly, though 27% of the East Timor articles provided historical information about
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the conflict, none of the Kosovo articles provided similar historical context for that 
situation.
In addition to these statistical measures, Time printed a lengthy commentary by 
Charles Krauthammer which touched on many of the unspeakable realities that governed 
our inaction in East Timor and action in Kosovo, noting “When China oppresses Tibet, 
Russia ravages Chechnya or Indonesia reduces East Timor to rubble, we do not intervene. 
China, Russia and Indonesia matter. But Serbia doesn’t. So when Kosovo is overrun, we 
strike” (1999, p. 118).
Newsweek
The coverage of the massacres in Newsweek was perhaps some of the most mixed 
coverage of any of the media outlets included in this analysis. Twenty-four percent of the 
Kosovo articles contained historical descriptions, whereas 33% of the East Timor articles 
included that variable. Conversely, 82% of the Kosovo articles provided follow-up 
details on the situation as opposed to a paltry 17% of the East Timor articles. Another 
standout statistic was that 50% of the East Timor articles provided details about the 
manner of the victims’ death, compared to 14% of the Kosovo articles.
One Newsweek article of note appeared in the Atlantic edition of the magazine 
(which was not counted in the figures used in this assessment). In it, the writers 
rationalized inaction in East Timor by incorrectly noting “nobody would mistake East 
Timor for a major strategic asset, and nobody can argue that the vital interests of any 
major power are threatened” (Bartholet, Moreau, Hirsh, Roberts, & Roberts, 1999, p. 20).
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CHAPTERV 
Conclusions
Inherent in any qualitative analysis is a certain measure of subjectivity which may 
color the findings. Certainly, this analysis is in no way intended to provide 
comprehensive evidence for the validity of the propaganda model, rather its role is to 
serve as one more example to add to the growing body of documentation for the 
phenomenon of worthy and unworthy victims.
Perhaps the most consistent factor associated with the qualitative analysis of the 
media outlets is that their coverage consistently lacked depth and breadth. Worse still is 
the finding that much of the references to these conflicts that contained any substance 
were often letters to the editor or special commentaries; a significant level of detail was 
not present in the day-to-day reporting on the conflicts.
Research Questions
Research Question 1
To the first question, “can a systems theory analysis of driving factors be 
predictive of media treatment of world events by the news media in the United States,” it 
can affirmatively be concluded that this is the case from an analysis of the data. As the 
propaganda model predicted, coverage of the two conflicts was indeed skewed 
dramatically in favor of Kosovo. Additionally, the qualitative analysis illustrates that 
market pressures corresponded with an overall poor quality of coverage of both of the 
conflicts as measured by the standards outlined above. Important contextual and 
historical information, as well as dissident voices were consistently missing from the 
articles analyzed.
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Research Question 2
To the second question “does the propaganda model articulated by Chomsky and 
Herman offer insight into the motivations and behaviors that define news coverage,” it 
can be concluded that indeed, the data produced demonstrated that the propaganda model 
was valuable in being predictive about the behavior of the agenda-setting media. As the 
propaganda model would dictate, the quantity of coverage was dramatically higher for 
the Kosovar Albanians (victims of an enemy state) than for the East Timorese (victims of 
a client state). However, the qualitative analysis was less conclusive. Though the 
qualitative variables were numerically higher for Kosovo articles, they were roughly the 
same as a percentage of the total articles in both situations. It is possible that the 
deficient quality of coverage is attributable to market pressures which tend to sacrifice 
quality for expediency and profit, as opposed to being the result of manipulation by the 
political elite. Even if this is the case, the end result is still in line with the propaganda 
model and affirms much of the media criticism of the modem day.
Research Question 3
The third question asked “does the reporting of the ‘agenda-setting’ print media 
differ on violent acts when perpetrated by states friendly to the US (Indonesia) from the 
reporting of similar violent acts perpetrated by enemy states of the US (Serbia).” Here 
again, the data indicate that this is the case. Even when accounting for certain differing 
contextual variables, there was overwhelmingly more coverage for the Kosovo crisis than 
for the one in East Timor.
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Research Question 4
The next question asks “is the quantity of reporting by the ‘agenda-setting’ media 
on the topic of victims of violence different in the case of East Timor (when perpetrated 
by a client state) versus Kosovo (when perpetrated by an enemy state).” The data showed 
that this was overpoweringly the case; in terms of sheer numbers, and in spite of 
accounting for differentiations between the East Timor and Kosovo crises, the Kosovo 
atrocities received vastly more coverage than those in East Timor from all of the agenda- 
setting media outlets measured.
Research Question 5
The final research question posed was, “is the degree of follow-up investigation 
by the “agenda-setting” media on the topic of victims of violence by terrorist 
organizations different in the in the case of Kosovo as opposed to East Timor?” The data 
produced by this analysis produced inconclusive results that did not affirmatively answer 
this question. Generally, the inclusion of important information in the articles analyzed 
was poor overall for both Kosovo and East Timor. It should be noted, however, that 
these results are possibly attributable to some mitigating circumstances resulting from 
limitations of the analysis, which are subsequently described in greater detail. Further, 
this finding is still in keeping with the propaganda model, as it appears to be a systemic 
failing common to all of the publications. In this instance, the pressure producing the 
lower quality of coverage comes not from ideological pressure applied from political 
elites, but rather from a system in which the news media outlets are required to turn a 
profit, necessarily constricting how many resources will be applied toward costly follow-
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up investigation in these overseas conflicts in order to challenge the official view 
presented by the US government.
Criticisms / Limitations of Research
Racial Disparity
ft cannot be discounted that race played a role in the reporting of this conflict. 
Kosovar Albanians arc, for the most part, Caucasian and previous studies have shown the 
effect of this bias in news reporting is minimized to an extent in print media, given its 
textual nature and minimized use of imagery. Such bias is exaggerated to a greater 
degree in the television media, where visuals form the basis for the news reporting. In a 
commentary for Time magazine, Charles Krauthammer rebutted “. . .  on this issue, the 
Clinton Administration, which at home is irreproachably antiracist and which abroad 
intervened forcefully in Haiti and Somalia, deserves the benefit of the doubt” (1999, p.
118). Accordingly, it is doubtful that racial differences could completely explain the 
massive disparity between the coverage of East Timor and Kosovo.
US-led NATO Presence
US intervention in Kosovo, too, played a role in driving up the amount of 
coverage of that situation. In addition to being observed by experts like Bemays and 
Lippman, it stands to reason that when a nation goes to war, that nation’s news media 
will focus a significant amount of attention on the conflict. This was certainly the case in 
Kosovo, as detailed accounts of military technology and lengthy exposes about daily life 
as a soldier in the Balkans were published. Accounting for this additional coverage as a 
result of the NATO bombing campaign however, still leaves the period before and after
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the campaign in which coverage of the atrocities in Kosovo routinely drew more attention 
than the ongoing atrocities in East Timor.
Access to Information
Another possible explanation for the disparity of coverage between East Timor 
and Kosovo is the availability of up-to-date information as each story was breaking. East 
Timor is a less teehnologieally-advanced nation than Kosovo, and does not benefit from 
Kosovo’s proximity to the teehnological innovation centers in Europe. In addition, many 
foreign journalists and UN representatives were foreed to flee East Timor to eseape the 
Indonesian paramilitaries. This conelusion, however, is inadequate when one considers 
that the same was true in Kosovo. Moreover, several stories filed by the various news 
media wrote speeifieally about the surprising flow of information coming out of East 
Timor via the Internet in spite of the violence. For example.
With East Timor still roiled by violence, most foreign journalists have fled. The 
BBC’s site, however, has some of the most comprehensive coverage of both East 
Timor’s vote to break away from Indonesia and the conflagration that has erupted 
since. Choppy video shows burning buildings in Dili. A first-person report by 
Dutch journalist Irene Slegt, who was holed up in the United Nations compound, 
revealing some of the horrors.. . .  There is also footage of Indonesian President 
B.J. Habibie’s attempts to reassure the international commimity, and audio 
excerpts from an interview with the bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo . . .  (Petersen, 
1999, p .Bl l ) .
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Time Frame
One possible explanation for some of the mixed results from the analysis of 
qualitative variables is that the time period selected was too short, and that a longer-range 
analysis would afford us a more well-rounded picture. The situation in East Timor, for 
example, has been characterized by decades of near total inattention by the U.S. news 
media. Another important consideration is that the forensic investigation and subsequent 
war crimes trial of Slobodan Milosevic continued well into 2002, whereas attention to the 
plight of the East Timorese dropped off considerably after the 1999 series of massacres. 
Technological Advances
It is undeniable that technology, particularly the Internet, has radically impacted 
the news media and the market forces exerted on the press. Another possible explanation 
of the mixed results from the qualitative analysis is the advent of the Internet which has 
given activists and others outside the journalistic establishment the opportunity to publish 
their findings and receive international attention as a result. One article published during 
the period remarked specifically on the evolving role of the various news agencies;
slowly, however, that great divide -  between the once-a-day multicourse meal of 
original material served up by newspapers on the Web and the quickly changing 
menus of original fare of the cable and broadcast series -  is beginning to narrow 
(Barringer, 1999, p. C l4).
Sample Selection
One possible explanation for the inconclusive results of the qualitative variables is 
that the analysis was not detailed enough at weighing references to facts which elite 
interests would rather suppress. This analysis did not take placement of the stories about
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the two crises into account, so it is possible that the qualitative features that defined 
higher quality coverage of the conflicts was emphasized more in more prominent 
sections. Put another way, all articles were weighted the same no matter where in the 
particular publication they were placed, meaning that a front page story received as much 
credit as a letter to the editor. Anecdotally, the writer found that, with few exceptions, 
the anti-establishment rhetoric that provided richer contextual information about the 
situations was confined to the “letters to the editor” page of most of the publications. It is 
possible that, in the face of an energized activist community, the publications forced 
dissident views to the margins by relegating those voices to the “letters” section where 
they receive less attention.
Recommendations
Though Chomsky and Herman did a small measure of analysis on the broader 
scope, it would be valuable to expand the frame of this analysis to include more of the 
coverage preceding and following the massacres in order to capture a fuller picture of the 
U.S. media’s coverage of the conflicts. Another valuable addition would be a rubric by 
which placement of the stories within the various publications could be analyzed so that a 
weighted analysis could be established. Given the decline of the collective readership of 
the print news media and the growth of the television news viewing audience, another 
valuable expansion of the topic would be a companion piece focused on analysis of the 
television coverage of the two crises. As visual representations tend to elicit more potent 
emotional responses, and due to the enhanced economic pressures inherent to the medium 
of television, a comprehensive companion analysis would be immensely valuable at 
evaluating several of the tenets of the propaganda model.
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